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JUST [CAN'T] DO IT: THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
OVERLY RESTRICTED NIKE'S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN
HOLDING THAT ITS PUBLIC STATEMENTS WERE COMMERCIAL
SPEECH
I.

INTRODUCTION

Have you ever been Niked? According to an October 17, 1996 report on CBS's 48 Hours, to be "Niked" means to have one worker take
out his or her aggression on a fellow worker. 1 The CBS expose reported that Nike's factories in Vietnam were forcing workers to function under "sweatshop" conditions. 2 Employees were "paid below
minimum wage, work[ed] exhausting hours and sometimes face[d]
physical abuse-all to create the hottest and most popular athletic
shoe in the world."3
In response to public criticism and the unfavorable report, Nike
publicized its existing code of conduct, developed in the early 1990s
to ensure compliance with local employment laws in its foreign factories. 4 Despite Nike's intentions in creating the code-"to guarantee a
humane workplace"-an audit revealed that forty of fIfty employees
interviewed had never read the code, forty-eight worked longer than
permitted by law, and that levels of the toxic chemical toluene were
dangerously high.s As a second method of defense, Nike, "for the
purpose of maintaining and increasing its sales and profIts,"6 published various news releases, advertisements, and letters to newspaper
editors regarding its factory conditions. 7
In opposition to the advertising campaign, Marc Kasky fIled suit
against Nike under a California consumer protection law that permits
any citizen to formally accuse businesses of disseminating misleading
or false statements to the public. s California's law gives standing to
1. 48 Hours: Nike Sweatshops (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 17,1996), available
at http://store.cbs.com/video.php?itemID=4481&showID=I.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Roger Parloff, Can We Talk? A Shocking First Amendment Ruling Against Nike
Radically Reduces the Rights oj Carporations to Speak Their Minds. Will the Supreme Court Let It Stand?, FORTUNE, Sept. 2, 2002, at lO2. The code of conduct was "a statement of aspirational goals its contractors were supposed to
live up to." Id.
5. Id.
6. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 248 (Cal. 2002), cert. granted, 537 U.S. lO99
(2003), and cert. dismissed, 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003).
7. Tony Mauro, Let Nike Speak Up Jor Itself, USA TODAY, Oct. 14,2002, at A15.
8. James Kilpatrick, The Right to Free Speech and Tennis Shoes, TULSA WORLD,
Dec. 2, 2002, at A9. "[P] rovisions of California law [sic] authorize a private
individual, acting as a 'private attorney general,' effectively to prosecute a
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citizens who have not been injured; in all other states, however, Kasky
would not have a valid cause of action. Nike prevailed in the lower
courts;9 the Supreme Court of California, however, overturned the
judgments and found for Kasky.l0
Thereafter, Nike appealed to the Supreme Court of the United
States. 11 The Court granted certiorari to decide two questions:
(1) whether a corporation participating in a public debate
may "be subjected to liability for factual inaccuracies on the
theory that its statements are 'commercial speech' because
they might affect consumers' opinions about the business as
a good corporate citizen and thereby affect their purchasing
decisions"; and (2) assuming the California Supreme Court
properly characterized such statements as commercial
speech, whether the "First Amendment, as applied to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, permit[s] subjecting speakers to the legal regime approved by that court
in the decision beloW."12

Ultimately, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari "as improvidently
granted"13 without deciding whether corporate publicity, which may
be less than completely accurate, is entitled to full First Amendment
protection. 14
Because the California ruling was upheld, corporations in any public debate will now need to balance the desire to speak freely against
the risk of severe court-imposed sanctions. 15 The California ruling
means that critics of Nike's business practices can say anything, but
Nike's participation in public statements or debate would be stifled. 16
Unfortunately, "[a]t a time when business needs to be more, not less,
transparent, this will encourage [corporations] to withdraw from public debate and provide only the bare minimum of information on any
subject."17

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

business for unfair competition or false advertising." Nike, Inc. v. Kasky,
123 S. Ct. 2554, 2559 (Breyer, j., dissenting). See also CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE §§ 17200, 17204, 17500, 17535 (West 1997).
Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 854, 863 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000), rev'd, 45
P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002), cm. granted, 537 U.S. 1099 (2003), and cm. dismissed,
123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003).
Kasky, 45 P.3d at 247.
Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003).
Id. at 2555.
Id.
Shannon McCaffrey, Supreme Court Will Test Nike's Defense: The justices Will
Hear the Case of the Sneaker Maker, VVho an Activist Says Stretched the Truth,
PHIlA. INQ., Jan. 11, 2003, at A3.
Parloff, supra note 4, at 102.
Mauro, supra note 7, at A15.
Alex Benady, Nike's Supreme Fight on Free Speech, TIMES OF LONDON, Sept. 23,
2002, § 3 (Business), at 4.
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This case was perhaps the Supreme Court's "most important case in
years on the free speech rights of companies."18 Despite the potential
impact of this case on worldwide industry, the Court's failure to overturn the California ruling will "'chill' the exercise of free speech
rights"19 and cause corporations and other speakers to "censor their
own expression well beyond what the law may constitutionally
demand."20
This comment will first examine the extent of First Amendment
protection provided to commercial speech, the tests used to analyze
commercial speech, and explain the California law that allowed Marc
Kasky to file suit as a private individual. Second, this comment will
investigate the potential impact of the Court's decision on corporate
communications today and in the future. Finally, it will report on the
procedural history and current status of the case, and the status of
commercial speech as a whole.
II.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND LEGAL DOCTRINES

A.

Commercial Speech Is Protected by the First Amendment Only When It Is
Found Not to be False or Misleadintl

Commercial speech includes paid advertisements and product labels that describe food as "low fat," "chocolaty," or "new and improved."22 In other words, commercial speech is speech that
companies use to sell their products to the public. 23 Commercial
speech differs from political speech, which is completely protected by
the First Amendment, because it can be, and usually is, regulated by
the government. 24
Over the years, the Supreme Court has used three tests to determine when speech is commercial. The first test applies limited First
Amendment protection to speech promoting commercial transactions. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, the Supreme Court overturned a state statute that prohibited
the display and distribution of prescription drug information. 25 The
Court stated that First Amendment protection is not completely lost
on commercial speech just because the particular speech is in a form
that involves solicitation and profit. 26 In order to support a market18. Supreme Court to Hear Case on Commercial Speech: California Suit Accuses Nike of
False Statements About Overseas Factories, HOUSTON CHRON.,Jan. 11, 2003, at 6.
19. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554, 2568 (2003) (Breyer,]., dissenting).
20. Id. at 2569.
21. See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 247 (Cal. 2002).
22. See Pari off, supra note 4, at 108.
23. See id.
24. Id.
25. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
762 (1976).
26. Id. at 761.
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place of ideas where the consuming public can make informed economic decisions, some protection must be afforded to commercial
speech.27 The function of commercial speech is to propose a transaction; therefore, even though it does not get full First Amendment protection, commercial speech does deserve some protection. 28 As a
result, the state may only regulate techniques that are false, deceptive,
or misleading. 29
The second test requires consideration of economic motivation, advertising format, and specific reference to a product before determining if the utterance is commercial speech.30 In Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Products Corp., the U.S. Postal Service refused to deliver a contraceptives manufacturer's unsolicited advertisements. 3] The Supreme
Court found that the Postal Service's actions were unconstitutional because they violated the manufacturer's First Amendment rights. 32
From a constitutional standpoint, the Court reasoned that "[t]he fact
that protected speech may be offensive to some persons does not justifY its suppression," and that anyone who was offended by the objectionable mailings could simply choose not to look at them or throw
them away.33 Moreover, addressing the specific content of the mailing, the Court stated that advertisements implicating "substantial individual and societal interests are particularly deserving of some First
Amendment protection."34
The Court also applied what is listed below as the third test-the
Central Hudson test35-and noted that "[t]he protection available for
[a] particular commercial expression turns on the nature both of the
expression and of the governmental interests served by its regulation."36 The Court opined that economic motivation for mailing advertisements, combined with other characteristics, "provides strong
support ... that the informational pamphlets are properly characterized as commercial speech"37 and deserving of the "protection accorded to commercial speech."38
27. [d. at 765.
28. See id. at 761, 771 (observing that states can regulate the "time, place, and
manner" of commercial speech, but the content is protected by the First
Amendment).
29. [d. at 771-72.
30. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983).
31. [d. at 63.
32. [d. at 75.
33. [d. at 71-72.
34. See id. at 69 (noting that the advertisements were entitled to First Amendment protection partially because contraception "is protected from unwarranted state interference").
35. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Servo Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557 (1980).
36. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 68 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp, 447 U.S. at
563).
37. [d. at 67.
38. [d. at 68.
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The third test for commercial speech is multi-leveled and is related
solely to a speaker's economic interests. 39 In Central Hudson Gas &
Electric v. Public Seroice Commission of New York, the Public Service Commission attempted to control advertising that promoted the use of
electricity.40 The Court developed a four-part test that applies intermediate level scrutiny to commercial speech.41
The first step of the Central Hudson analysis asks "whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment."42 In order for a statement to be protected by the First Amendment it "must concern [a]
lawful activity and not be misleading."43 The second step asks whether
the government has a substantial interest in regulating the activity. 44
The third question asks if the regulation directly advances the governmental interest. 45 The fourth and last step in the analysis addresses
whether the regulation is more excessive than necessary to serve the
governmental interest expressed in the regulation. 46
In Kasky v. Nike, Inc., the Supreme Court of California primarily focused on the Central Hudson test. 47 The Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
and Bolger tests were the first to be developed and are more general
versions of the first and second prongs found in the Central Hudson
test. 48 For purposes of this comment, the tests were separated to provide emphasis on their origin.
B.

California State Law Prohibits False and Misleading Advertising and
Provides Consumers with the Ability to Enforce State Law49

California is the only state that has extended its law against false and
misleading advertising by businesses to allow private suits concerning
a company's public statements. 50 The law was "designed to punish
used-car salesmen who pitch clunkers as dreamboats, or manufacturers who bill foreign-made goods as 'made in the USA."'51 Businesses
found violating the California law could suffer sanctions ranging from
39. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 56l.
40. Id. at 55S.
41. See id. at 566; see also Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 251 (Cal. 2002) (noting that the Court "articulated an intermediate-scrutiny test" in Central
Hudson).
42. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 251-54 (Cal. 2002).
4S. See Pari off, supra note 4, at lOS ("Originally the Court's definition of commercial speech was narrow: speech that does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction.' But with the onset of more subtle, varied, and
sophisticated advertising techniques, that definition was broadened.").
49. Mauro, supra note 7, at A15.
50. David G. Savage, Nike Takes Ad Liability Case to High Court, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
15, 2002, at B6.
5l. Mauro, supra note 7, at A15.
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being enjoined from making similar statements in the future, to giving up profits made in connection with speech that is the subject of a
lawsuit. 52
C.

Nike's Commercial Speech Began on Television and Ended in the
Courtroom

In October 1996, CBS's 48 Hours aired an expose addressing "sweatshop" conditions in Nike's factories in Vietnam. 53 According to the
broadcast, employees were "paid below minimum wage, work[ed] exhausting hours and sometimes face[d] physical abuse-all to create
the hottest and most popular athletic shoe in the world."54 Nike responded to the claims by issuing press releases and sending letters to
newspaper editors, athletic department directors, and university
presiden ts. 55
Nike's campaign to defend its labor practices in foreign countries
spurred Marc Kasky, a California activist,56 to take advantage of the
state's broad unfair competition law. 57 Kasky claimed that Nike's advertisements were not political speech aimed at counteracting negative press, but instead, were deceitful advertisements used to promote
product sales. 58 As such, even if Nike's statements were unintentionally misleading, Kasky argued that the company should be punished
because the California unfair competition statute does not require a
malicious intent to deceive the public. 59
The Court of Appeal of California affirmed the trial court's decision
in favor of Nike. 60 The court held that Nike's communications were
part of the public debate regarding Nike's business practices. 61 The
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

60.

61.

Business Eye on Nike Appeal, N.Z. HERALD, Sept. 5, 2002, at C2.
48 Hours, supra note 1.
Id.
Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 854, 857 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000), rev'd, 45
P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002), cert. granted, 537 U.S. 1099 (2003), and cert. dismissed,
123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003).
See Parloff, supra note 4, at 108. Previously, Kasky settled false advertising
disputes with Perrier regarding its "spring water," and with Pillsbury Co.
labeling vegetables harvested in Mexico as "San Francisco style." Id.
See Kilpatrick, supra note 8, at A9 (stating that the California law "makes it a
criminal misdemeanor to disseminate any statement 'which is untrue or
misleading' and ... permits any citizen to sue for enforcement").
Free Speech for Nike, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2002, at B6.
See Pari off, supra note 4, at 104 (explaining that court sanctions could include a return of profits earned as a result of the misleading statements, the
running of an additional campaign to correct lie misunderstandings, and/
or Kasky's attorneys' fees).
Kasky, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 863 ("Our analysis of the press releases and letters
as forming part of a public dialogue on a matter of public concern within
the core area of expression protected by the First Amendment compels the
conclusion that the trial court properly sustained the defendants' demurrer
without leave to amend.").
Id. at 860.
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court opined that when issues are of public importance, the truth of
the statements involved in the debate are irrelevant because the public will decide what to believe. 62 Citing the "famous words" of Judge
Learned Hand, the court stated:
[T]he First Amendment "presupposes that right conclusions
are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues,
than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many
this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it
our a11."63
The court of appeal also noted that, just because Nike' s speech had
an economic motive, it did not mean that it was no longer significant
to the intended audience. 64 "The purpose of [Nike's] communications was not merely to sell shoes but to change minds. The protection of efforts to change minds is the very essence of free speech."65
The Supreme Court of California reversed the court of appeal,
holding that Nike's advertising campaign was commercial speech and,
therefore, not entitled to full First Amendment protection. 66 The
court held that corporate public statements aimed at maintaining or
increasing sales and profits, or in response to allegations regarding
poor working conditions, are commercial speech and can be regulated to prevent consumer deception. 67 The Supreme Court of California concluded that Nike's response to the 48 Hours expose was
commercial speech because the direct recipients of the information
were previous and potential buyers of the company's products. 68
Nike's factual statements about its business operations, according to
the court, were entitled to less constitutional protection because Nike
was capable of verifying the accuracy of the statements. 69 Although
the Supreme Court of California concluded that Nike's speech was
"commercial speech for purposes of applying state laws barring false
and misleading commercial messages,"70 it did not decide whether
that speech was indeed false or misleading, and it remanded the matter to the intermediate appellate court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.71
62. See id. at 861.
63. Id. (citing United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y.
1943) ).
64. See id. at 862 ("[C]ommercial motivation does not transform noncommercial speech into commercial speech.") (quoting Blatty v. N.Y. Times Co.,
728 P.2d 1177, 1186 (1986)).
65. Free Speech for Nike, supra note 58, at B6.
66. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 262-63 (Cal. 2002).
67. Id. at 262.
68. Id. at 258-59.
69. See id at 259. The converse argument is that "[f]actual errors are part of
any robust back-and-forth and do not generally nullify the constitutional
protection afforded to speech." Free Speech for Nike, supra note 58, at B6.
70. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 247.
71. Id. at 262-63.
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On October 16, 2002, Nike submitted its petition for certiorari to
the United States Supreme Court. 72 Central to Nike's argument was
that the public was entitled to information regarding issues of general
concern, and the California ruling prevents dissemination of information that will lead to informed decision making. 73 Kasky filed his reply
brief on November 15, 2002.1 4 In January 2003, the Court decided to
grant certiorari and heard oral arguments on April 23, 2003. 75
Two primary issues controlled oral arguments: (1) did Nike's communications meet the requirements of commercial speech; and (2)
does the California law under which Kasky filed his suit unconstitutionally turn private citizens into "private attorneys general" by allowing anyone to bring a false advertising claim without suffering any
actual harm?76
Justice O'Connor was pushing for a clear definition of commercial
speech and advertising, while Justice Scalia found the definition irrelevant as long as Nike's campaign was misleading.77 These questions
were equalized by Justice Breyer when he stated: "[i]t's both [commercial and non-commercial speech] if you try to sell a product and
make a statement important to the public debate.,,78 Justice Breyer
continued to summarize the difficult issue before the Court by stating
that "[t]he government 'has the right to regulate unfair, deceptive
advertising' to protect consumers from being duped . . . . On the
other hand, 'the [First] Amendment is designed to protect all participants in a public debate."'79
Nike's argument began with Harvard University law professor Laurence Tribe stating that the letters written by Nike and sent to athletic
directors, assuring them that the company did not' engage in unfair
labor practices, were not commercial speech because the letters were
not addressed to specific customers. 80 U.S. Solicitor General Theodore B. Olson appeared on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting Nike. 81 In strong support of previous arguments
72. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 2002 WL 32101098 (No.
02-575).
73. See id. at *9.
74. Respondent'S Brief in Opposition, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 2002 WL 32lO1066
(No. 02-575).
75. See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 537 U.S. 1099 (2003).
76. Bill Mears, Supreme Court Looks at Free Speech Rights of Corporate A rnerica: Opponents Square Off Over Nike Case, (June 27, 2003), at www.cnn.com/2003/
LAW/04/23/scotus.free.speech/index.html.
77. Id.

78. Id.
79. David G. Savage, justices Urged to Reject Suit Against Nike: The California Case
Before the U.S. Supreme Court Will Test the Boundary Between Corporate Free Speech
and False Advertising, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2003, at A20.
80. Charles Lane, Supreme Court Considers Nike's 'Free Speech,' WASH. POST, Apr.

24, 2003, at E2.
81. Id.
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made to the Court,82 Olson urged the Court to avoid attempting to
define the differences between commercial and non-commercial
speech, and instead to declare the California unfair competition law
unconstitutiona1. 83 Olson, and his arguments on behalf of the Bush
Administration, focused on the realistic fear that the California law
transforms "anyone with a whim and a grievance and a filing fee ...
[into] a government-licensed censor."84 Comments made by Justice
Ginsburg echoed the concerns voiced by Olson. 85
Ultimately, on June 26,2003, in a per curiam decision, the Supreme
Court decided to dismiss the grant of certiorari that it granted only six
months earlier. 86 Concurring Justice Stevens justified the Court's decision to avoid taking a stand on the future of commercial speech by
stating that: (1) the Supreme Court of California had not entered a
final judgment; (2) neither Nike nor Marc Kasky had standing to
bring the suit to federal court; and (3) any decision made by the
Court would be premature. 87 Justice Stevens believed the Supreme
Court of California decision to be interlocutory, and that some of
Nike's disputed communications might be classified as commercial,
while others might be non-commercia1. 88 Without clear categorization, Justice Stevens reasoned that there is a possibility that additional
federal questions could arise during further state proceedings,
thereby making any decision by the Supreme Court of California not
fina1. 89
The dissent responded by pointing to the fact that the Supreme
Court of California made its final decision, admitting that there was
nothing left to decide on "that' issue of federal importance. 9o The
dissent supported its disagreement with the majority'S decision by citing previous examples wherein the Supreme Court made a final determination of similar holdings by the Supreme Court of California. 91
The dissent also explained that a reversal of the Supreme Court of
California would be a final decision that would allow the court of appeal decision to stand as law in the state. 92 Additionally, the dissent
predicted that when the case returned to California for further adjudi82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
9l.
92.

See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
Lane, supra note 80, at E2.
Id.
Robert S. Greenberger, Bush Administration Backs Nike in High Court Case,
WALL ST.]', Apr. 24, 2003, at A12.
Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554, 2554 (2003) (per curiam) (dismissing
writ of certiorari as improvidently granted).
Id. at 2555 (Stevens,]., concurring).
Id. at 2556-57 (Stevens,]., concurring).
Id. at 2556 (Stevens,]., concurring).
Id. at 2563 (Breyer,]. and O'Connor,]., dissenting).
Id. at 2563-64 (Breyer,]. and O'Connor,]., dissenting) (citing Cox Broad.
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975)).
Id. at 2564 (Breyer,]. and O'Connor,]., dissenting) (stating that "[a]n outright reversal of the California Supreme Court would reinstate the judg-
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cation, the court would "simply seek to determine whether Nike's
statements were false or misleading, and perhaps whether Nike was
negligent in making those statements."93
The m~ority's second reason for dismissing the writ of certiorari
was that neither party had federal standing. 94 The Court found that
Kasky lacked standing because by acting as a private attorney general
for the state of California, he had neither a federal claim nor had he
suffered any actual injury.95 The Court also found that Nike lacked
standing because the Supreme Court of California's decision was not a
"final judgment alerting tangible legal rights."96 The dissent agreed
that Kasky lacked standing because he did not suffer an "injury in
fact."97 The dissent disagreed with respect to Nike, however, because
standing applies to the plaintiff who brought the action to federal
court, not the plaintiff that sued in state court. 98 The dissent noted
that, "Nike, the state-court defendant-not Kasky, the plaintiff-has
brought the case to this Court [a]nd Nike has standing to complain
here of Kasky's actions .... These actions threaten Nike with 'injury
in fact.' "99
As its last justification for dismissal, the majority stated that a decision at this juncture would be premature. IOO The majority recognized
the uniqueness and importance of the First Amendment issue
presented in this case,101 but warned that a detailed answer to such a
significant constitutional issue should not be announced until after
analysis of a complete factual record is established. 102 In rebuttal, the
dissent cited Cox Broadcasting System v. Cohn, stating, "a refusal immediately to review the state-court decision might seriously erode federal
policy."103 The dissenting Justices also recognized the "chilling" effect
on speech feared by so many individuals, and corporate and government entities in the wake of the California ruling. 104

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

ment of the California intermediate court, which affirmed dismissal of the
complaint without leave to amend.").
[d. at 2563 (Breyer, j. and O'Connor, j., dissenting). After the Supreme
Court dismissal, the parties settled out of court. See infra note 214 and accompanying text.
Kasky, 123 S. Ct. at 2557.
[d.
[d. at 2558.
[d. at 2560-61 (Breyer, j. and O'Connor, j., dissenting).
[d. (Breyer, j. and O'Connor, j., dissenting). The dissent stated that
"[slince Nike, not Kasky, now seeks to bring this case to federal court, why
should Kasky's standing problems make a critical difference?" [d.
[d. at 2560.
[d. at 2555, 2558.
[d. at 2558.
[d. at 2559.
[d. at 2562, 2568 (Breyer, j. and O'Connor, j., dissenting) (citing Cox
Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 482-83 (1975».
See infra Part lILA; see also Kasky, 123 S. Ct. at 2567-69.
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In its conclusion, the majority admitted that a more elaborate factual record might, in fact, add to the public debate that Nike is trying
to protect, but thought it wise not to make a decision addressing the
current marketplace of ideas at this stage in the process. 105
III.
A.

ANALYSIS
Corporate Expression of Commercial Speech Will Never be the Same

The impact of the Supreme Court of California's decision will be
felt far beyond the shores of the United States. I06 For example, European businesses are required to publish "social responsibility" reports. I07 Social responsibility reports encourage active
communication between businesses and stakeholders by requiring
complete disclosure of corporate information to the public. 108 These
businesses will find it more difficult than American businesses to refrain from sanctioned public debate because they must comply with
the governing corporate communication regulations. 109 It will be difficult to adhere to the regulations, not because of the specifics published in the reports, but because the self-proclaiming statements are
at risk of being interpreted as misleading. For example, Nike lists in
its fiscal year 2001 Corporate Responsibility Report eight different
ways that it hopes to aid environmental protectionYo It is possible,
but hopefully unlikely, that this list could be viewed as an advertisement trying to gather support from environmentalists as product consumers. Under current California law, this type of interpretation
would lead to litigation or sanctions. Interpreting corporate responsibility reports as product advertisements is exactly what companies that
publish such reports, whether by choice or under mandate, are trying
to avoid.
In an effort to illustrate the far-reaching impact of this case, on
March 3, 2003, SRI Media and CoreRatings Limited, both British media groups, filed an amicus brief in support of Nike with the United
States Supreme Court. III In contrast to the specific concerns about
this case, Elliot Schrage, former senior vice president of global affairs
105. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. at 2559.
106. See Just Don't Say It: To What Extent Do Companies Have the Right to Free Speech?,
ECONOMIST, Dec. 14, 2002, at 59 [hereinafter Just Don't Say It Il].
107. Id.
108. SRI Media PLC and CoreRatings Limited File Legal Brief with the United States
Supreme Court in Nike v. Kasky, PRIMEZONE MEDIA NETWORK, Mar. 3, 2003,
available at 2003 WL 4409829 [hereinafter SRI Media PLC and CoreRatings
Limited File Legal BriefJ.
109. Just Don't Say It IJ, supra note 106, at 59.
llO. Nike, Inc., FY 2001 Corporate Responsibility Report, at 6, at http://www.nike.
com/ nikebiz/ nikebizJhtml?page=29&item=fyO 1.
Ill. SRI Media PLC and CoreRatings Limited File Legal Brief, supra note 108.
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at Gap, argued, "too much attention is paid to individual statutes at
the expense of the bigger global picture."112 He stated:
One could argue that the focus on U.S. legal standards, and
cases like Kasky involving the Alien Tort claims, is misplaced.
If Nike says on its website "Our factories never violate local
laws," and customers in Britain can sue Nike based on that
website, then Nike is going to change its statements regardless of the outcome of the Kasky case. II3
In 2001, France enacted a new regulation, the Nouvelles Regulations Economiques (NRE), which requires all nationally listed businesses to release their social and environmental information to the
public. 1l4 Under the law developed in Kasky, if the report contains a
false or misleading statement and the company does business in the
State of California, the foreign company could be punished for violating California law. California law does not make exceptions for companies, foreign or domestic, that are required to produce social
responsibility reports. As stated by Peter Clarke, Director of SRI
Media:
We are gravely concerned about the potential 'chilling' effect of the California decision upon European business enterprises who may find that their [Corporate Social
Responsibility] communications, even though issued from
Europe to a European media audience and made in compliance with European law, might well land them in a California Court because of the extra-territorial reach of the
decision. II5
In light of the California ruling, all corporate communications to
the public will be considered advertising and will be subject to strict
judicial scrutiny.II6 As "advertising," the communications would be
considered commercial speech and may be subjected to a lesser level
of First Amendment protectionY 7 Regardless of the issue the business is addressing, the California court categorized all business communications with the public that could result in product purchases as
commercial advertising. I IS "In doing so, it authorized the suppression
of those public statements and the seizure of the speaker's profits,
112. Sarah Murray, Legal Case for Doing the Right Thing, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2003,
at P17, available at 2003 WL 16398005.
113. Id. (quoting Elliot Schrage).
114. Julie Gorte, Letters to the Editor, Make Social Disclosure Mandatory, FIN.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2002, at P12, available at 2002 WL 10418828l.
115. SRI Media PLC and CoreRatings Limited File Legal Brief, supra note 108.
116. See Benady, supra note 17, at 4.
117. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
u.S. 748, 770 (1976).
118. Nike Set to Ask Appeal from Supreme Court, WOMENSWEAR, Aug. 2, 2002, available at 2002 WL 10886292.
.
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whenever ajury deems the statements potentially incomplete or otherwise misleading."119 The decision might stop corporate communications within California because any resident could bring a company
"to its knees unless it persuades a jury that everything [the company J
said was error-free and omitted nothing."120
Kasky will have a large geographic impact not because Nike is a wellknown company, or even because of its home base. 121 The impact of
the case is global because "[iJfyour communication is received in California ... and you're doing business there-which means every Fortune 500 company-you have to immediately worry, right now, about
any public statements you make about your company's practices."122
Every company performing a business transaction within the State of
California is bound by the laws of that state, and thereby governed by
the outcome of Kasky. 123 This ruling even impacts businesses that post
information on their website about labor and business practices, or
their opinion on a public dispute. 124
Mter Kasky, it will be necessary for lawyers to take a more active role
in the review and issuance of press releases. 125 "Lawyers can no
longer be passive editors. . .. Instead, they must challenge their public relations colleagues as to whether the potential marketing gains of
a release justify the inevitable litigation risks."126 Corporate lawyers
will now have the additional responsibility of ensuring that their companies do not disseminate anything more than the most basic business
practice information. 127 Mter this ruling, businesses in California will
have to think carefully before using the media to respond to employment charges. 128 Instead, businesses will have no choice but to respond in court, and could suffer severe financial loss because the
public will pass judgment before a court even hears the case. 129
The Kasky decision could result in "the death of commercial public
relations in California . . . effectively gag[gingJ any business that
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

128.
129.

Id.
Benady, supra note 17, at 4.
Parloff, supra note 4, at 104. In fact, Nike is headquartered in Oregon. Id.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 104, 106.
See David Graulich, Press Release: Write in Haste . .. Repent, NAT'L LJ., Oct. 14,
2002, at Dl2.
Id.
See Mike McKee, Nike Hires Big Guns to Pursue PR Policy Statements Case, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 5, 2002, at 4. "The net effect of this novel ruling
. . . is to make it extremely dangerous for virtually any business or other
organization to utter anything beyond the most innocuous and vaporous
generalities about its practices, whether in this country or abroad." Id.
(quoting Professor Laurence Tribe, Harvard Law School).
Steven C. Bahls &Jane Easter Bahls, Shut Up Already!, ENTREPRENEUR, Sept.
2002, at 88.
See id.
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makes a public statement which is heard in California."130 Kathy
Cripps, President of the V .S. Council of Public Relations Firms, commented that the California law will limit how public relations departments do business, and even limit the amount of business they receive
because companies will no longer wish to participate in public
debate. 131
As Judge Chin stated in his dissent in Kasky, "[h]andicapping one
side in this important worldwide debate is both ill considered and unconstitutional. Full free speech protection for one side and strict liability for the other will hardly promote vigorous and meaningful
debate."132 Others have commented that this "law will stifle companies and other [organizations] from making public statements on any
subject, even if they are only matters of opinion .... "133 "California is
the fifth-largest market in the world. Few corporations can afford to
Ueopardize] their operations there."134
B.

Nike is Proving to Have Many More ''Friends of the Court" Than Marc
Kasky

Within seven weeks of the Court granting certiorari, more than a
dozen companies and private organizations ftled briefs in support of
Nike's position.1 35 As previously mentioned, the V.K. media groups
SRI Media and CoreRatings Limited ftled an amicus brief in support
of Nike and open corporate communication. 136 CBS, the network
that originally aired the "sweatshop expose,"137 in addition to
Microsoft, CNN, the New York Times, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, ftled an amicus brief with the Court in support of Nike. 138
Surprisingly, voices of concern came not only from corporate
America, nor additional California residents eager to file their own
lawsuits, but from Congress. 139 Ohio Representative Dennis Kucinich
circulated a petition asking members to support Marc Kasky.140 According to Representative Kucinich, if Nike were to win, the definitions of commercial and political speech would be negatively
redefIned. 141 All five of Oregon's representatives signed a letter urg130. Benady, supra note 17, at 4 (quoting Professor Laurence Tribe, Harvard
Law School).
131. Id.
132. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 263 (Cal. 2002) (Chin, j., dissenting).
133. Benady, supra note 17, at 4.
134. Id. (quoting Professor Laurence Tribe, Harvard Law School).
135. Boaz Herzog, Debate Erupts Over Nike Free-Speech Case, OREGONIAN, Mar. 26,
2003, at E2.
136. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
137. See Bahls, supra note 128, at 88.
138. Just Don't Say It II, supra note 106, at 59.
139. See Herzog, supra note 135, at E2.
140. Id.
141. See id. "[T]he case 'could reshape constitutional definitions of commercial
and political speech, giving corporations unprecedented freedom to make
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ing Congress not to support Kucinich's petition, stating that his arguments "fail to tell the whole story."142 The Oregon Representatives
wrote that only with a "full, open and transparent debate about these
issues . . . [will] consumers receive complete and accurate information."143 The definitions of commercial and political speech as we
know them today could change after Kasky, but this should be viewed
as a positive advancement towards better communication between
businesses and consumers.144
Other amicus briefs filed with the Court came both from corporations and public relations firms.145 In a combined amicus brief filed
by Exxon Mobil, Microsoft, Morgan Stanley, and Glaxo Smith Kline,
the companies argued two points. 146 First, they argued that Nike's
statements did not fit within the definition of commercial speech because they did not cause a "commercial harm" severe enough to warrant a lack of First Amendment protection. 147 Second, the companies
argued that Nike had standing to appear before the Supreme
Court. 148
The companies contended that speech is determined to be a matter
of public concern through analysis of its content, form, and context. 149 They argued that the context of Nike's speech, regarding issues involving labor practices in developing countries, addresses issues
of great modern day concern. 150 Nike's communication took shape in
the form of media stories, letters to editors, and letters to athletic di-

142.
143.
144.
145.

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

false a~1. misleading statements in advertisements, newspaper editorials, and other
venues.
Id.
Id.
See Herzog, supra note 135, at E2.
See supra Part lILA.
See, e.g., Brief of the Center for the Advancement of Capitalism as Amicus
Curiae Supporting the Petitioners, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 537 U.S. 1099 (2003)
(No. 02-575) (urging the Supreme Court to abolish the commercial speech
doctrine); Brief of Amici Curiae the Association of National Advertising,
Inc., the American Advertising Federation, and the American Association
of Advertising Agencies in Support of Petitioners, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 537
U.S. 1099 (2003) (No. 02-575) (stating that Nike's speech was not commercial, the California court's decision would have a chilling effect on corporate communications, and Kasky did not have standing to sue because he
suffered no harm); Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chamber of Commerce of
the United States of America in Support of Petitioners, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky,
537 U.S. lO99 (2003) (No. 02-575) (arguing that the California ruling
would suppress speech on important public policy issues and that commercial speech analysis should apply only to products or services offered for
sale) .
Brief of Exxon Mobil, Microsoft, Morgan Stanley, and Glaxo Smith Kline as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 3-5, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 537 U.S.
lO99 (2003) (No. 02-575).
Id. at 5-2l.
Id. at 21-27.
Id. at 5-6.
Id. at 6.
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rectors, all of which are established venues for public debate. I51 They
further argued that, "[l]ike any other speaker, a corporation may be
expected to make only those statements of fact that it believes to be
true. But whether a particular statement of fact is 'true' is often a
matter of legitimate dispute [within a forum for public debate]."I52
The government cannot regulate speech under the shield of the First
Amendment merely because it prefers one side of the debate to the
other. I53 Furthermore, "[a] pplying the commercial speech regime to
a corporation's statements on matters of public concern would drastically curtail valuable speech on vital issues of the day."I54
Addressing the issue of standing, the companies argued that Nike
could invoke the Supreme Court's authority to set aside the California
court's ruling because the ruling denied Nike a federal right-the
First Amendment right to speak on matters of public concern. I55
They further argued that Nike had standing before the Court based
on its ability to show actual injury-the company had been forced to
defend its past speech in an ongoing lawsuit, and it could show that its
speech was chilled by the threat of more lawsuits. I56
Another amicus brief, filed by forty leading newspapers, magazines,
broadcasters, wire-services, and media-related professional and trade
associations (the "News Agencies"), on behalf of Nike, focused on the
potentially devastating impact of the California decision. 157 The brief
stated that "[e]ven a cursory review of prominent press coverage from
the past few years reveals a vast array of corporate speech-on issues
ranging from race discrimination to environmental sustainability to
personal health and safety-that would now be subject to California's
new strict liability dragnet."I58
First, the News Agencies argued that the Supreme Court of California unreasonably broadened the scope of commercial speech, allowing it to encompass speech directed solely to reporters or editors
in their functional capacities as news gatherers. I59 The state court ruling provides for businesses to be "sued for consumer protection violations based on answers given to reporters' questions, press releases,
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

156.
157.

158.
159.

[d. at 7.
[d. at 9.
[d. at 13.
[d. at 21.
[d. at 21-22. "The California statutes cause Nike injury-in-fact by forcing the
company to defend its past speech in an ongoing lawsuit that the First
Amendment forbids, and by chilling the company's future speech through
the threat of more such forbidden lawsuits." [d. at 23.
[d.
See Brief Amici Curiae of Forty Leading Newspapers, Magazines, Broadcasters, Wire-Services, and Media-Related Professional and Trade Associations
in Support of Petitioners at 4, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 537 U.S. 1099 (2003)
(No. 02-575).
[d. at 1.
[d. at 4.
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op-ed pieces or 'editorial advertisements,' regardless of whether the
business's speech is printed or appears as part of a news story that
includes opposing viewpoints."160 The News Agencies argued that if
the California ruling were allowed to stand, it would impose strict-liability on businesses, while allowing their critics to comment freely.161
They also pointed out that the more often a business responds with
"no comment," the more likely a story will be shelved for being onesided. 162 As such, fearing liability, very few business-related stories will
be published for public knowledge. 163
Second, the News Agencies contended that the commercial speech
restriction on business communications takes away some of the responsibility enjoyed by the media. 164 Advertisements that propose
commercial transactions are subject to less than First Amendment
protection because the consumer has no means to verifY the message. 165 When a business is reporting on internal practices, however,
the media acts as a source for verification, because the public is provided with commentary on both sides of the issue, allowing each consumer to make an informed decision. 166
Pfizer, Inc. submitted an amicus brief to the Court that cited the
valuable contribution that corporate discussions add to the marketplace of ideas. 167 It also offered the Court alternatives, should it decide to uphold the California court. 168 First, Pfizer asked the Court to
implement a "Right of Reply," allowing businesses to respond to public accusations regarding their products, services, or business operations. 169 The "Right of Reply" would be fully protected by the First
Amendment, thereby protecting the speaker and adding to the debate
for the listener. 17o Only criticism by a third party would trigger the
"Right of Reply," rendering it unlikely that a commercial speaker
would induce criticism in order to launch a false or misleading
reply.l7l
Pfizer's second suggestion was that the Court clarifY its Central Hudson analysis to make it clear that a determination that speech is false or
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

171.

[d. at 4-5.
[d. at 6.
[d. at 15.
[d.
[d. at 17.
[d. at 18.
[d. at 20. The media acts as a screening device for the public, deciding
whether to publish potentially misleading information at all, and if it does,
whether to publish that information with contrasting viewpoints. See id.
See Brief of Amicus Curiae Pfizer Inc. in Support of Petitioners at 1-3, Nike,
Inc. v. Kasky, 537 U.S. 1099 (2003) (No. 02-575).
[d.
[d. at 21.
[d.
[d. at 23.
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misleading is not a per se violation that results in immediate sanction
without further analysis. 172 It stated:
[A] llegations that the speech at issue is false or misleading
should not create an absolute exception to the need to examine the strength of the government's consumer protection interest in the specific circumstances, the means by
which that interest is advanced, the potential for less restrictive measures to alleviate any legitimate concerns about deception, and the countervailing risk of suppressing truthful
speech of "public value."173
Pfizer urged the Court to reverse the California decision, and set forth
a rule stating that a determination or allegation that a business communication is false or misleading should be the beginning of the First
Amendment analysis, not the end. 174
C.

Amicus Briefs Supporting Marc Kasky Favor Far-Reaching Consumer
Rights and a Strict Interpretation of Commercial Speech

The amicus brief submitted by the National Association of Consumer Advocates (NACA) primarily focused on the validity of the California unfair competition law. 175 The NACA conceded that the
California law is unusual, but argued that uniqueness in a state law
does not make it unconstitutionaJ.l76 The NACA contended that if
the Solicitor General's argument is upheld, then numerous federal
statutes would be declared unconstitutional as well. 177 The brief cited
the Truth in Lending Act and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act as
examples of statutes that do not require the individual to prove actual
harm. 178 The NACA, however, failed to disclose to the Court what
standard of proof the individual must meet in order to prevaiJ.l79 Using the Truth in Savings Act as an example of why actual injury is not
required, the NACA stated that when there are limited resources for
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

177.

178.
179.

Id. at 25.
Id.
Id. at 28.
See Brief for the National Association of Consumer Advocates as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondent at 1-2, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 537 U.S. 1099
(2003) (No. 02-575).
Id. at 5.
Id. at 5-6. The Solicitor General's "Question Presented" is whether the First
Amendment precludes a private party to challenge deceptive statements "if
the private party himself did not rely on those statements ... or suffer any
actual injury by reason of such reliance." The Solicitor General proposes
the question be answered in the negative. Id.
Id. at 6; see also Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2) (A) (2001);
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(K) (a)(2)(A) (2001).
See Brief for the Nat'l Ass'n of Consumer Advocates, supra note 175, at 6
(citing numerous cases where the claimant prevailed without proving actual injury, but not examining the burden of proof on the parties or the
elements needed to make a case on either side of the issue).
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enforcement, it might be more cost-effective to leave enforcement to
"individuals in the private sector who stand to profit from efficiently
detecting and prosecuting ... violations."lso In many states, however,
where the individual is empowered to act as an enforcer instead of a
wronged consumer, the damage award is limited to an injunction, not
monetary damages. lsl
Also in support of Kasky, Congressional Representatives submitted a
brief supporting the distinction between commercial and non-commercial speech. ls2 Their brief reminded the Court of its recognition
in Central Hudson that there is a "commonsense distinction between
speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area
traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of
speech."ls3 The representatives countered Nike's "speech chilling" argument with the contention that "Nike's strong economic incentive to
maintain and expand sales of its products, even in the face of antisweatshop criticism, will ensure that it will continue speaking out
about its labor practices."ls4 Although the representatives recognized
that commercial speech is "less likely than other forms of speech to be
inhibited by proper regulation,"ls5 they failed to cite any circumstance
in which a corporation had not halted or censored its public communications in fear of court sanctions. The representatives failed to illustrate with certainty that corporate communications will not change
after Kasky. How can the entire public relations industry be wrong?

D.

Because the California Ruling was Upheld, Kasky's Original Suit was
Remanded to State Court to Investigate the Truth of Nike 's Statements

The only issue decided by the Supreme Court of California in Kasky
was whether Nike's advertising campaign constituted commercial
speech. ls6 The court did not decide the issue whether the statements
were actually false or misleading. ls7 Because the Supreme Court dismissed the writ of certiorari, thus upholding California's ruling that
Nike's speech was commercial, the case was remanded to the state
court where the actual text of the advertisements would have been
180. Id. at 7; see also Truth in Savings Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4308-09 (2001).
181. See Brief for the Nat'l Ass'n of Consumer Advocates, supra note 175, at 7-8.
"[M]any states authorize some form of remedy for deceptive advertising
without all of the 'traditional' requirements described by the Solicitor General." Id.
182. See Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent by Members of the United
States Congress, Representatives Dennis J. Kucinich, Bernard Sanders, Corrine Brown, and Bob Filner at 1, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 537 U.S. 1099 (2003)
(No. 02-575).
183. Id. at 3-4 (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Servo Comm'n of
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980)).
184. Id. at 5.
185. Id. at 5-6 (quoting Friedman V. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 (1979)).
186. Kasky V. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 247 (Cal. 2002).
187. Id. at 262.
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scrutinized for false or misleading information. 188 If the content had
been found to be false, the court would have imposed sanctions that
would have begun a new era in corporate communications. 189
For a period spanning more than twenty years, the Supreme Court
Justices have struggled to define commercial speech and sent conflicting signals to the public, illustrating the need for the Court to clearly
outline the level of protection that should be afforded commercial
speech. 190 Over the years, the Court has awarded increasing protection to commercial speech. 191 Justices Scalia and Thomas previously
voiced their concern over the Central Hudson test and the level of Constitutional protection afforded commercial speech. 192 Justice Thomas
argued, "it is time to erase the distinction between commercial and
political speech altogether and give full First Amendment protection
to both."193 Others have commented that "[i]f there's any inner core
of the First Amendment, it would be that the Amendment prohibits
the government from weighing in in a fashion that favors one viewpoint over another."194 If commercial speech is merged with political
speech so that it has complete protection, then businesses will be able
to continue communicating freely with the public because not every
statement placed into the marketplace of ideas will be interpreted as
an advertisement. 195
By dismissing the writ of certiorari, the Court failed to answer questions that "directly concern the freedom of Americans to speak about
public matters in public debate," and delay in answering such questions "may inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights of
free speech without making the commercial speech issue significantly
easier to decide later on."196 Without more specific answers as to what
188. Id. at 262-63.
189. See id. at 250; see also CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17500, 17535 (West 1997).
190. See Gina Holland, High Court to Weigh Nike Free-Speech Case, BRADENTON HER.
ALD, Jan. 11, 2003, at 1. See also Parloff, supra note 4, at 110. "The Supreme
Court of the United States has not addressed . . . the boundary between
commercial speech and other forms of speech in many, many years, and
the existing precedents are extremely vague." [d. (quoting Professor Robert Post, Univ. of Cal. at Berkeley, School of Law).
191. See Mauro, supra note 7; see also David G. Savage, justices to Hear Nike FreeSpeech Claim, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2003, at Cl (stating that "Justice Clarence
Thomas, a conservative, and Justice John Paul Stevens, a liberal, have called
for greater free-speech protection of advertising.").
192. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 517 (1996) (Scalia,J.,
concurring in part) ("I share Justice Thomas's discomfort with the Central
Hudson test, which seems to me to have nothing more than policy intuition
to support it.").
193. Mauro, supra note 7, at A15.
194. Parloff, supra note 4, at 110 (quoting Walter Dellinger, Nike attorney and
former acting Solicitor General).
195. See id.
196. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554, 2560 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).

2004]

Nike's First Amendment Rights

303

is defined as commercial speech, the California ruling "may well 'chill'
the exercise of free speech rights."197
Another alternative for corporate communication has surfaced and
been endorsed by Nike CEO, Philip Knight. 198 It requires the dissemination of "audited corporate and social responsibility statements," including information about work conditions and environmental
issues. 199 Any false or misleading statements in these reports would be
punishable, but it is unclear who would enforce it, what the punishment would be, or how these audited statements would differ from
those that originally led to the suit against Nike. 20o It is important to
note that after the California decision in Kasky, Nike decided not to
publicly release its "corporate social responsibility" report. 201
E.

Corporate America and the Public Relations Industry React With Surprise
and Concern to the Court's Decision

"[T]he Supreme Court-out of intellectual laziness or reckless indifference-has unwisely given trial lawyers the power to curb and to
tax free speech."202 Companies are concerned about their rights in
the wake of the Nike ruling, including a freedom of speech double
standard, where individuals can say anything and corporations must
stay silent or risk a lawsuit. 203 The large economic risk that businesses
face when forced to choose between silence and the courtroom,
amounts to a tax on corporate free speech. 204 This "tax" will have a
chilling effect on open debate. 205
Every advertiser's public relations campaign will be affected by this
case. 206 Corporations and businesses will undergo a self-inflicted gag
order and drop out of important public debates. 207 The gag order
might extend well beyond the United States, because British companies with U.S. affiliations warn that their websites must be monitored;
even a British website could be subjected to California long-arm
jurisdiction. 208
The chilling effect that Kasky will have on free speech, unless the
issue reaches the Supreme Court again in a few years, will dramatically
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. at 2568 (Breyer,]., dissenting).
See Parloff, supra note 4, at llO.
Id.
Id.
See Just Don't Say It II, supra note 106.
Robert]. Samuelson, The Tax on Free Speech, NEWSWEEK,July 14, 2003, at 4l.
See id. This author suggests that failure to immediately strike down the California ruling could lead to censorship of public comments. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See Nike Faces Legal Challenge to its Freedom of Speech, CAMPAIGN, July 11, 2003,

at 12.
207. Sandy Brown, For Corporate Speech, the Other Shoe is Yet to Dmp: Issue in Limbo
After Supreme Court Dismisses Nike Case, ADWEEK, June 30, 2003, at 7.
208. See Nike Faces Legal Challenge to its Freedom of Speech, supra note 206, at 12.
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impact public debate. If, under California law, or subsequent federal,
law, public relations materials were deemed commercial speech, the
public would hear "distorted views and the press would only hear one
side of the argument regarding difficult and important issues.''209 In
short, the marketplace of ideas as we know it today would cease to
exist.
On June 27, 2003, the day after the Supreme Court dismissed the
writ of certiorari, the economic market felt the sting of stifling commercial speech when Nike's stock fell six percent. 210 Since the
Court's decision, Nike has investigated the possibility of cutting back
its public relations activities. 211 The company, however, is not allowing the lack of a final ruling from the Supreme Court change everything it does; Nike will continue to endorse athletes in exchange for
their communication of a message to the public. 212 How Nike will
communicate that message, to what audience, and whether it will lead
Nike to court is a question that ,remains unanswered.
IV.

CONCLUSION

CBS had no idea how its routine television expose on Nike's business practices would impact the future of worldwide communication.
By dismissing the writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court ran the risk of
significantly hindering public debate and corporate communications
in general. In deciding to hear the case, many originally hoped that
the tests for commercial speech would either be redefined, or the distinction would be erased entirely.213 There is still a distinct possibility
that global commercial speech will change; but we will have to wait to
find out its ultimate fate. For now, individuals like Marc Kasky are
free to say anything they want about a corporation, but no one will
know the accuracy of those comments. Further delaying a detailed
analysis of commercial speech, but in an attempt to improve the workplace environment, Nike and Kasky settled their dispute in September
2003. 214 It was reported that both parties agreed that a settlement
would be more beneficial than future litigation to factory workers
209. Douglas Quenqua, U.S. Supreme Court opts Not to Rule on Nike PR Case,
BRAND REpUBLIC, june 28, 2003, at 1.
210. Chris Ayres, Nike Faces Trial jar Lying, TIMES OF LONDON, june 28, 2003, at
20.
211. Nike Goes jar Retro Cred in $305m Deal to Buy Converse, BRAND REpUBLIC, july
11, 2003, at 1.
212. See Matthew Garrahan, How to Keep Doing it All Over the Warld, FIN. TIMES,
Aug. 5, 2003, at 10.
213. See supra Part lILA.
214. Press Release, Nike, Inc. and Kasky Announce Settlement of Kasky v. Nike
First Amendment Case (Sept. 12,2003), at http://www.nike.com/nikebiz/
news/pressreIeasejhtml?year=2003&month=09&letter=f (last visited jan.
23,2004).
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around the globe. 215 As stated by the plaintiff's attorney, Patrick
Coughlin:
Ultimately, both Nike and Mr. Kasky agreed that this resolution benefits two key groups: factory workers and consumers
worldwide. Given the [Fair Labor Association's] collaboration across a wide spectrum of companies, universities and
[non-governmental organizations], it is an excellent vehicle
for Nike to further develop its corporate responsibility efforts
and allow interested consumers to measure the performance
of Nike and other companies through public reporting. Mr.
Kasky is satisfied that this settlement reflects Nike's commitment to positive change where factory workers are
concerned.:h6
Settlement might have been the best outcome for the parties
named in the suit, but there remains a high level of concern over the
impact of the California ruling.217 The primary concern coming from
corporations, media and non-government organizations alike, is that
they cannot include company publicity within their annual social responsibility reports. 218 A general fear of publicity within businesses
that communicate within California will impact future communications, whether there is a court case in the near future or not. Nike is
continuing its fight for "corporate transparency,"219 but it will take another attack on corporate communications to bring commercial
speech back into the United States Supreme Court arena.
Alyssa L. Paladino

215. [d. Nike has agreed to make additional workplace-related program investments (augmenting the company's existing expenditures on monitoring,
etc.) totaling $1.5 million. Nike's contribution will go to the Washington,
D.C. based Fair Labor Association (FlA) for program operations and
worker development programs focused on education and economic opportunity. [d.
216. [d.
217. See id.
218. [d.
219. [d.

